Targeting the poorest in a performance-based financing programme in northern Cameroon by Flink, I.J.E. (Ilse) et al.
Targeting the poorest in a performance-based
financing programme in northern Cameroon
Ilse J E Flink,1,* Roland Ziebe,2 Djebba Vagaı¨,2 Frank van de Looij,3
Hilda van ‘T Riet3 and Tanja A J Houweling1
1Department of Public Health, Erasmus MC University Medical Centre, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2The Higher
Institute of the Sahel, the University of Maroua, Maroua, Cameroon and 3Cordaid, The Hague, The Netherlands
*Corresponding author. Department of Public health, Erasmus University Medical Centre, Rotterdam, PO Box 2040,
3000 CA Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: i.flink@erasmusmc.nl
Accepted on 1 December 2015
Abstract
Performance-Based Financing (PBF) is a promising approach to improve health system perform-
ance in developing countries, but there are concerns that it may inadequately address inequalities
in access to care. Incentives for reaching the poor may prove beneficial, but evidence remains lim-
ited. We evaluated a system of targeting the poorest of society (‘indigents’) in a PBF programme in
Cameroon, examining (under)coverage, leakage and perceived positive and negative effects. We
conducted a documentation review, 59 key informant interviews and 33 focus group discussions
with community members (poor and vulnerable people—registered as indigents and those not
registered as such). We found that community health workers were able to identify very poor and
vulnerable people with a minimal chance of leakage to non-poor people. Nevertheless, the target-
ing system only reached a tiny proportion (1%) of the catchment population, and other poor and
vulnerable people were missed. Low a priori set objectives and implementation problems—
including a focus on easily identifiable groups (elderly, orphans), unclarity about pre-defined crite-
ria, lack of transport for identification and insufficient motivation of community health workers—
are likely to explain the low coverage. Registered indigents perceived improvements in access,
quality and promptness of care, and improvements in economic status and less financial worries.
However, lack of transport and insufficient knowledge about the targeting benefits, remained bar-
riers for health care use. Negative effects of the system as experienced by indigents included nega-
tive reactions (e.g. jealousy) of community members. In conclusion, a system of targeting the poor-
est of society in PBF programmes may help reduce inequalities in health care use, but only when
design and implementation problems leading to substantial under-coverage are addressed.
Furthermore, remaining barriers to health care use (e.g. transport) and negative reactions of other
community members towards indigents deserve attention.
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Introduction
In 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reached their
target date. Although progress in reaching the goals has been made
(United Nations 2013), there are indications that it was inequitable
(Boerma et al. 2008; Victora et al. 2012). The poor profit much less
from the MDGs than their richer counterparts, especially in the area
of maternal and child care (Boerma et al., 2008). Facility-based health
services, such as skilled birth attendance, were most inequitable,
whereas community-level interventions were more equitable (Barros
et al. 2012).
The mechanisms that underlie socio-economic inequities in ma-
ternal and child health care are complex, and various social, eco-
nomic, cultural and political determinants play a role (CSDH 2008).
Low health system performance is one of the factors that underlies
these inequities in developing countries. The costs of care, the low
quality of services, if provided at all, and lack of respectfulness of
health care providers towards poor and otherwise vulnerable pa-
tients, are important barriers to seeking health care among the poor-
est of society (HSKN 2007; Bakeera et al. 2009).
A promising approach to address low health system performance
is Performance-Based Financing (PBF) (Witter et al. 2012). PBF tar-
gets health facilities using a ‘fee-for-service-conditional-on-quality’
approach (Fritsche et al. 2014). PBF has been found to be effective in
improving health care quality, health care utilization and health out-
comes (Basinga et al. 2011; Witter et al. 2012). However, there are
concerns that socio-economic inequalities are not adequately ad-
dressed and that a focus on easy-to-reach population groups, rather
than poor and vulnerable people, may exacerbate inequalities (Witter
and Adjei 2007). A targeting system within PBF, with incentives for
reaching the poor, may help increase health care utilization among
the poorest and most vulnerable of society. However the workings of
targeting within PBF have not yet been properly described and eval-
uated. There are indications that targeting can be costly, bureaucratic,
and can lead to leakage to richer or more influential groups, and to
under-coverage of the target population (CSDH 2008).
Of further concern is the notion that implementing new guide-
lines or procedures in routine health care practice, such as a target-
ing system, is not easy (Davies and Tailor-Vaisey 1997; Grol and
Grimshaw 2003; Grol et al. 2007), let alone in resource poor set-
tings. Grol and Grimshaw (2003) and Grol et al. (2007) note three
categories of barriers that can hamper the implementation of health
care guidelines: organizational barriers, social barriers and profes-
sional/individual barriers. Organizational barriers can include finan-
cial disincentives, organizational constraints and resource
constraints. Social barriers can include lack of support from man-
agement, standards of practice and social norms. Professional/indi-
vidual barriers can include negative attitudes and lack of
knowledge. Conversely, a better compliance to a guideline is
associated with acuteness of the health problem, the quality of the
evidence, compatibility of the guideline with existing values, the
complexity of decision-making, concrete descriptions of the desired
performance and limited necessity of new skills and organizational
change (Grol and Grimshaw 2003).
Cameroon’s progress towards meeting the MDGs has been slow,
especially for child and maternal health (United Nations 2012), with
inequalities in reaching these goals between the poorer North and
particularly rural areas, and the richer centre provinces [Institut
National de la Statistique (INS) and ICF International, 2012]. In
2012, a PBF programme with specific incentives for reaching the
poorest of society was implemented in 14 health facilities in the
North. In the programme, extremely poor and vulnerable poor are
registered as ‘indigents’ (from here on referred to as ‘indigents’;
other poor and vulnerable people not registered in the programme
will be referred to as ‘non-indigents’).
The aim of this study was to evaluate a system of targeting the
poorest of society in Northern Cameroon. Specifically, we aimed to
describe the targeting criteria and procedures as defined in pro-
gramme documents and as implemented in practice and assess the
implications of these criteria and procedures in terms of (under)
coverage, leakage and perceived positive and negative effects.
Methodology
Study setting
The study took place in Northern Cameroon, in the PBF pilot pro-
gramme of the Diocese of Maroua. The area is characterized by ex-
treme poverty (INS and ICF International 2012). The programme
includes 14 health facilities (13 located in rural zones) run by the
Catholic mission, which have performance contracts with payment
on the basis of performance targets (e.g. consultations and deliveries).
The PBF programme uses a ‘fee-for-service-conditional-on-quality’
payment scheme (Fritsche et al. 2014). Services are linked to primary,
secondary and community level indicators (see Supplementary
Materials S3–S5). The PBF payments for indigents exempt indigents
from user-fees. For other patients, user-fees apply (Ziebe and Vaggai
2013). The facilities provide quarterly overviews of indigents treated
to the payment agency, after which they are remunerated. Subsidies
can double depending on quality of care, which is evaluated quarterly
through community surveys and audits (CDD 2013). If revenues from
PBF are larger than actual costs, performance bonuses are available
for health personnel and community health workers known in the
programme as “COSA members”.
Study sample
We included 7 out of 14 facilities in our study: two facilities were
purposively selected (the only participating hospital and urban
Key messages
• A system of targeting the poorest of society in PBF programs may help reduce inequalities in health care use as im-
provements in access, quality and promptness of care for the poorest of society were perceived.
• Community health workers were able to identify very poor and vulnerable people with a minimal chance of leakage to
non-poor people.
• There was substantial under coverage which can, in part, be explained by design and implementation problems associ-
ated with targeting procedures.
• Removal of user-fees for the poorest of society did not discard all (financial) barriers to health care use and those tar-
geted by the system perceived negative reactions by other community members.
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facility); the remaining 12 rural facilities were stratified into three
socio-economic regions: very poor, poor and less poor (Table 1)
(Yonga and A 1995). To ensure there would be enough indigent par-
ticipants in our sample and saturation would be reached, we ran-
domly selected three facilities from group one (where more indigents
live) and two facilities from groups two and three, by drawing notes
from an envelope.
Documentation review
All PBF project documentation was requested from the project co-
ordinator and reviewed. During field visits, facility-level documenta-
tion (e.g. indigent registers) was collected. Documentation on the
targeting procedures was scarce. The following documents were
available and were reviewed: project proposal (CDD 2011), baseline
study (CDD 2012a), activity execution guide (CDD 2013), proced-
ure manual (CDD 2012b), indigent lists, consultation registers,
workshop report (CDD 2012c) and business plans of the health
facilities.
Interviews with key informants
Key informants were purposively selected on the basis of their role
in the PBF programme. We included a variety of respondents, from
health care personnel to COSA members. A total of 59 interviews
were conducted (Table 2).
Focus group discussions
Participants
Several groups of community members were invited to the
focus group discussions (FGDs): (a) indigents who had attended the
facility in 2013; (b) indigents who had not attended the facility in
2013; and (c) otherwise poor and vulnerable people not registered
as indigent (‘non-indigents’) who had attended the facility in 2013.
Separate male and female focus groups were organized. The facili-
ties provided a list of all indigents and their characteristics (age, gen-
der, facility attendance) registered in the catchment area in 2013.
Local researchers split the list into four new lists by gender (male/fe-
male) and facility attendance (yes/no). Next, the lists were rear-
ranged in alphabetical order and 15 people were randomly selected
and invited for an FGD. If the selected indigent was a child, the
main caretaker was invited. Non-indigents were identified by health
care personnel (people that had difficulties paying health care costs
in the past year) and were also invited.
In total, 33 FGDs with 238 participants (5–11 participants per
group) were conducted (see Table 4). We were unable to organize six
FGDs with indigents who had not attended the facility and three FGDs
with non-indigents because participants were too weak to come to the
FGD or had passed away. Indigent and non-indigent participants had
similar socio-demographic characteristics (Table 3). Indigents who did
not visit the facility were more often above the age of 60.
Procedures
Two local researchers, one senior (R.Z.) and one assistant (D.V.), were
extensively trained in qualitative research techniques and pilot-tested
the tools in Zamay, a facility that had not been selected for the study.
Some minor changes were made hereafter, particularly in terms of lan-
guage use (e.g. some uncommon terms like stigmatization were
explained).
The local research team conducted the FGDs and interviews be-
tween September 2013 and April 2014, in chaplaincies, churches or
in laboratories and conference rooms at the health facilities. The
interviews lasted between 23 and 87 min and were conducted in
French. The FGDs lasted between 22 and 113 min and were con-
ducted in French or one of the local languages (Fulfude´, Bana,
Molfole´, Moufou, Mafa, Maktal, Mada, Oulde´me´). All interviews
and FGDs were recorded. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. As
many of the local languages are only spoken, the FGD recordings
were translated and transcribed into French.
Table 1. Selected facilities and their characteristics
Name of facility Poverty profile
(Very poor/poor/
moderately poor)
Selected for the study
(Yes/No)
Catchment
population
Number
of staff
members
Number of
COSA membersa
Centre de sante´ de Douvangar Very poor Yes 13108 5 30
Centre de sante´ de Djinglya Very poor No
Centre de sante´ de Goudjoumde´le´ Very poor Yes 9292 5 20
Centre de sante´ de Magoumaz Very poor No
Centre de sante´ de Mayo Oulde´me´ Very poor Yes 32623 9 42
Hopital de Tokombe´re´ (hospital) Very poor Yes 16952 62 40
Centre de sante´ de Gue´tche´we´ Poor No
Centre de sante´ de Ouro-Tada Poor Yes 19635 9 68
Centre de sante´ de Zamay Poor No (Pilot facility)
Centre de sante´ de Ze´le´vet Poor No
Centre de sante´ de Domayo (urban) Less poor Yes 14825 23 6
Centre de sante´ de Guili Less poor Yes 17090 5 24
Centre de sante´ de Kila Less poor No
Centre de Sante´ de Sir Less poor No
aCOSA members are community health workers.
Table 2. Overview of the interviewed key informants
Respondent type Number of interviews
COSA membera 26
COSA president 6
Health facility personnel 21
Health facility director 3
PBF coordinator 2
Health coordinator 1
Total 59
aCOSA members are community health workers.
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Instruments
Guides were used for the interviews and FGDs (Supplementary
Materials S1 and S2) and included general and probing questions
focusing on defining different socio-economic groups in society, tar-
geting procedures and positive and negative effects of targeting on
access to care, quality of care, stigmatization or other non-specified
effects. Indigent participants were asked additional questions on
their perceptions of social labeling, while indigent participants
who had not attended the facility were asked additional questions
on reasons for non-attendance. A short demographic questionnaire
was administered after the interviews and FGDs.
Analysis
The analysis was based on the framework method (Pope and Mays
2000). After transcribing the recorded interview/FGD, the researchers
familiarized themselves with the transcriptions. Hereafter, a set of 10
interviews and FGDs from three different facilities were coded in
NVivo by the primary researcher (I.F.). This led to the development
of generic analysis frameworks for the interviews and FGDs (Pope
and Mays 2000; Gale et al. 2013). Next, three researchers (I.F., R.Z.
and D.V.) applied the generic analysis frameworks to a representative
set of five interviews and FGDs using NVivo. The purpose of this step
was to evaluate the frameworks and cross-check the identified themes
and codes. The researchers discussed their findings and the analysis
frameworks were updated. Hereafter, the primary researcher (I.F.)
systematically coded the remaining interviews and FGDs using the
new analysis frameworks. Emerging codes were added and some
codes were merged. Finally, NVivo was used to create so-called ‘tree
Table 3. Characteristics of the Focus Groups and participants
Indigents that attended
the facility in 2013 (n ¼ 88)
Indigents that didn’t
attend the facility in 2013 (n ¼ 20)
Non-indigents that attended
the facility in 2013 (n ¼ 80)
Number of female FGDs 7 4 5
Number of male FGDs 7 4 6
Age mean (SD) 48.4 (18.6) 66.2 (17.7) 46.4 (16.8)
>60 years 25.0% 65.0% 17.5%
Proportion females 55.7% 55.0% 50.0%
Marital status
Single 15.9% 20.0% 10.0%
Married 39.8% 25.0% 38.8%
Separated 10.2% 55.0% 15.0%
Widow 23.9% 17.5%
Widower 3.4% 1.3%
Unknown 6.8% 17.8%
Main occupation
Housewife 45.5% 30.0% 45.0%
Farmer 30.6% 45.0% 32.5%
Student 2.3% 3.8%
Guard 1.1%
Constructor 1.3%
Retired 2.3%
Unemployed 14.8% 15.0% 11.3%
Informal jobs 1.3%
Unknown 3.4% 10.0% 5.2%
Difficulty in meeting food needs
the past month
88.0% 88.9% 92.5%
Indigent criteria meta 89.8% 100% 27.5%
aAccording to the predefined list of criteria.
Table 4. Differences between community perceptions of poverty
and vulnerability, targeting criteria applied in practice and prede-
fined targeting criteria
All groups and characteristics Community In practice Predefined
Level of importance
Elderly 11 11
Orphans 11 11 x
Widows 11 11 x
Blind 1 11 x
Handicapped 1 11 x
Leprosy patients 1 1 x
Mentally ill 1 1 x
Chronically ill 1 1 x
No family or support 11 11 x
Inability to work 11 11
Food insecurity 11 11
Lack of strength 11 11
Dependency 11 11
Lack of financial resources 1 11 x
Doesn’t own land or cattle 1 1
Has nothing 1 11
No or dirty clothing 1 11
No housing or in bad state 1 1
Cannot pay school fees 1 1
Large families 1 1
þþ, highly frequent, highly extensive;þ , little frequent, little extensive;
frequency, the number of respondents that mention the theme; extensive-
ness, the extensiveness of the theme across different sources;
x, Criteria predefined in programme documents.
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maps’ to discover patterns in the data by determining frequency (how
many times a code was mentioned) and extensiveness (how many par-
ticipants/sources mentioned a code). To gain a deeper understanding
of the issue under study, data from different sources were triangulated
and references to illustrative quotations were selected.
Results
Figure 1 depicts the various steps undertaken to target the indigents
in the PBF programme in Cameroon and the implications of the sys-
tem. Each step will be described using the results of the documenta-
tion review, the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and the FGDs with
indigents and non-indigents.
Targeting procedures
Criteria and guidelines predefined in programme documents
At the start of the programme, 10 criteria for identifying indigents
were established during a workshop with PBF, health facility staff
and community stakeholders (CDD 2012c) (see Table 4).
COSA members were held responsible for the identification of indi-
gents and received 50 000 FCFA (around e76) yearly as compensation
(CDD 2013). COSA are linked to the facility catchment area and
its members are elected community representatives (e.g. members of
the parish). Facility catchment areas consist of several villages and each
village has at least one COSA member.
A priori objectives for the number of indigents to be identified
were set yearly. These were based on facility registries of people who
were unable to pay for health care in the previous year and served as
an indication. At the time of this study (2013), the objective was to
register a total of 1272 indigents in a catchment population of
191 544 (0.7%). Quarterly objectives, serving as minimum, were also
set by health facilities in business plans together with COSA mem-
bers. Expected numbers of indigents in business plans varied per quar-
ter due to the seasonal patterning of health care utilization.
Dissemination of criteria and guidelines to community health
committees and health personnel
According to the guidelines (CDD 2011), dissemination of criteria
and targets to COSA members should be done by the COSA presi-
dent. In practice, most COSA members received the criteria from the
COSA president and/or the health facility. A few COSA members
mentioned that they never received any fixed criteria and that they
established their own criteria ‘Facilitator: have the targeting criteria
been pre-established? “No, we observe and we know the commu-
nity” (COSA member, Douvangar)’. The objectives for the number
of indigents to be identified were not clear. A few COSA members
mentioned that they received a quota: ‘We bring the number that
they ask us to bring. If we bring more people the resources might
run dry(COSA member, Domayo)’. ‘The project fixes the number of
indigents brought by each COSA member. It would be better if this
is left open so that the maximum is done (COSA member, Domayo)’
while others said there were ‘no objectives’.
Identification of indigents in the community and health facility
In practice, mostly the COSA members and sometimes health per-
sonnel identified indigents. In a few cases previously established
lists (i.e. established by churches) of indigents were already avail-
able. COSA members identified indigents taking into account the
pre-defined criteria and several economic characteristics (Table 4).
Hence, the criteria applied in practice were broader than the pre-
defined criteria. COSA members mentioned that they used various
methods to identify indigents. The most frequently mentioned
were: consulting other community members ‘The first thing we do
is contact the village chiefs and ask them if there are people who
suffer . . . ’(COSA member, Goudjoumde´le´), using own knowledge
of the community ‘We know our community, even before this pro-
ject, we knew the people with problems’(COSA president) and
household observations. Household observations mainly consisted
of an informal chat with the ‘potential’ indigents, checking their
personal state (hygiene, appearance) and the state of their housing.
Less often mentioned were surveys or formal meetings with com-
munity members or COSA members. Most COSA members men-
tioned that they received a ‘little bonus’ at the end of the trimester.
Some mentioned getting paid per indigent referred while others
said that they did not get paid at all ‘Our work is voluntary, we do
not receive any financial compensation’(COSA member,
Domayo).
Health personnel also mentioned various ways of identifying
indigents at the facility level. Most mentioned that they had a list
with names of indigents, submitted yearly by the COSA and/or
that COSA members wrote out a note for the indigents mention-
ing their status. Health personnel usually first looked at the list
‘When the indigents are sick they come to our health facility, if
we have the list we take care of them immediately’(Health per-
sonnel, Douvangar) and the referral notes ‘I see a lot of indigents
that have a little note in their hands which helps us to recognize
them as indigents’(Health personnel, Domayo). Some health per-
sonnel mentioned that they further checked the patient’s finan-
cial status by posing them or their companion questions ‘These
patients are often accompanied by others that confirm that the
person suffers and that there is nobody to take care of them and
when you ask them questions you equally recognize that the per-
son has no one and you have no other choice’(Health personnel,
Domayo).
Identification of new indigents happened quite often at all facili-
ties. According to the key informants, these were patients that came
from outside the catchment area and did not appear on the COSA
lists (e.g. Nigerian immigrants attending the Douvangar facility) or
other groups that were difficult to identify, like street children
(Domayo). At the hospital, many of the indigents came from outside
the catchment area and were not on the COSA list ‘If there are peo-
ple coming from outside the catchment area that don’t have finan-
cial means it’s the hospital that puts their name on the indigent
list’(COSA president). To check whether these patients fulfilled the
criteria, health personnel mentioned they used different methods:
observations, posing questions, presenting the bill to check whether
it can be paid, or going back to the villages to check if the patients
were really indigents.
Implementation problems
Several problems with the implementation of the targeting sys-
tem within the PBF programme were identified. In line with the
review by Grol and Grimshaw (2003), the problems could be
categorized into three levels: organizational, social and profes-
sional/individual.
Organizational
Financial incentives were considered too low and not in balance
with the increase in workload ‘Some COSA members have gotten
angry because they are not remunerated despite the fact that they
have referred and accompanied indigents to the facility.’(COSA
president). There was also a lack of transport to identify more
Health Policy and Planning, 2016, Vol. 31, No. 6 771
indigents, particularly in mountainous areas, and to bring them to
the facility ‘It’s not easy to do your identification by foot. A bike
would make things a lot better’(COSA member, Tokombe´re´ hos-
pital). FGDs further showed that in only a few cases indigents were
actually accompanied to the facilities by COSA members. Finally,
there were no clear procedures as to how to inform the indigents
about the benefits of the system. As a result many indigents were not
informed at all ‘I wasn’t informed. Another blind person got back
from the facility yesterday night and told me that the center invites
poor people to come’(Male indigent, Mayo-Oulde´me´).
Social
There was dispute among health personnel and COSA members
about the distribution of performance bonuses and there were doubts
about the fairness of the payment system. ‘The financing system needs
to be clear and concrete. It shouldn’t only be communicated verbally.
Now they promise us things but we never receive anything’(COSA
member, Goudjoumde´le´). ‘There are problems at the level of the
bonuses. They say that the bonuses will be distributed equally among
health personnel but in reality this is not the case’(Health personnel,
Guili). There were also worries, particularly among health personnel,
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the steps undertaken to target indigents in the PBF programme and its implications.
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about the future of the targeting system and if and how it would con-
tinue once PBF would end ‘We are worried that the project will end,
the people [indigents] will be used to it and all of a sudden there will
be no more funds to take care of them’(Health personnel,
Douvangar).
Professional/individual
There was a lack of clarity and knowledge about the criteria ‘What
do you do when there is a family with many children? Do you con-
sider them all as indigents?’(COSA president, Goudjoumde´le´). KIIs
further revealed that in practice COSA members often identified the
easily recognizable indigents such as the elderly, orphans/otherwise
vulnerable children, widows/widowers, the handicapped and the
blind. ‘What I see a lot on the list here are the abandoned
elderly’(Facility director, Mayo-Oulde´me´). ‘COSA members are
mostly interested in the elderly and poor children. There is not a
good system to identify other indigents.’(Health personnel,
Domayo). COSA members had more difficulty identifying those in-
digents whose illnesses were not visible, such as HIV/AIDS patients.
Additionally, COSA members and health personnel found the
current criteria too strict and some groups were left out ‘We need to
expand the criteria to the poor because in August [the wet season]
we see that almost everyone could be considered an indigent, they
cannot pay the health care costs, their granaries are empty and they
are famished’(Health personnel, Mayo-Oulde´me´). At the same time,
many COSA members were unmotivated to identify more indigents
‘They don’t recognize our efforts even though we help the facility a
lot’(COSA member, Douvangar).
Targeting implications
Under-coverage and leakage
There were no indications that leakage was an important concern
within the targeting system. Only a minority of the health personnel
experienced that some ‘indigents had money on them when presented
with the bill’. In turn, criteria applied in practice were similar to the
community perceptions of poverty and vulnerability (Table 4). Socio-
economic data further confirmed that indigents were indeed poor and
socially vulnerable (Table 3).
Conversely, under-coverage was a concern. First, identified indi-
gents constituted a tiny proportion of the catchment population
(maximum 1.2%; see Table 4) and the indigents that attended the
facility constituted an even tinier proportion of the population
(maximum 0.7%; see Table 5). Second, non-indigent participants
identified themselves as indigents ‘An indigent is like me, I have
nothing; my husband passed away, I suffer and have nothing to
eat’(Non-indigent participant, Goudjoumde´le´) and were found to
have similar socio-economic characteristics (Table 3). Third, the
focus on only some of the groups that were listed in the predefined
criteria (widows, orphans) while focusing less on other groups (e.g.
HIV patients) and the poor motivation of COSA members to iden-
tify more indigents is likely to have influenced coverage rates.
Perceived positive and negative effects of the targeting system
Change in access to care. According to most indigents, access to care
had improved since the introduction of the targeting system ‘I went
to the health center with my brother’s son who had a fracture. I had
only 2000FCFA on me but they gave it back and the care, which
lasted 3 months, was for free’(Female indigent, Goudjoumde´le´). The
relatively high percentages of registered indigents that attended the
health facilities in 2013 (32–60%; Table 4) support this finding.
Nevertheless, these percentages also show that not all identified indi-
gents used care, and our FGDs and KIIs revealed that not all (finan-
cial) barriers were discarded by the system. In fact, many similar
barriers were identified in the indigent (those that attended the facil-
ity and those that did not) and non-indigent groups. One persisting
financial barrier mentioned by many indigents was the long distance
to the facility and the lack of financial means to pay for transport
‘It’s good to go to the health center when you are sick. But for me, I
don’t go because I can’t find any money for the
transportation.’(Female indigent, Domayo). Some indigents re-
ported that they preferred to go to a traditional healer because the
distance was shorter and the fees were lower. Not having any money
to buy food when hospitalized or to swallow prescribed medication
was also mentioned as a barrier by some indigent participants.
There were also non-financial barriers that hampered access to
care. Most often mentioned was a low perceived severity of the ill-
ness ‘For others, when the illness is not that serious they will take
some “bil-bil” [local alcoholic beverage] and think it will pass’(Male
indigent, Ouro-Tada).
Key Informants additionally mentioned that there were some in-
digents that ‘refused to accept their status’ and feared stigmatiza-
tion. Also, indigents expressed worries regarding the quality of care
when it was free. Key Informants further revealed some difficulties
for indigents in accessing secondary care (hospitals). As only one
hospital (only providing free obstetric care) participates in the PBF
programme, health personnel at the primary level often mentioned
that hospital treatment costs were not covered ‘It was clearly
defined within the programmethat in the case of a referral, the per-
son has to pay’(COSA member, Domayo). However, health person-
nel said that the facility sometimes paid for transport to the hospital
or part of the treatment costs ‘Once they arrive at the hospital and
say the bill is around 50 000 CFA, we divide that in two and we pay
around half’(Health personnel, Goudjoumde´le´). Two indigent
Table 5. Targeting outcomes for the included facilities
Hoˆpital de
Tokombe´re´
Douvangar Mayo-
Oulde´me´
Goud
joumde´le´
Ouro- Tada Domayo Guili
Population of catchment area 16 952 13 108 32 623 9292 19 635 14 825 17 090
Patients that attended the health facility in 2013 9019 4150 5400 3037 9966 24 873 3061
% population that attended the health facility in 2013 53.2% 31.7% 16.6% 32.7% 50.8% 167.8% 17.9%
Number of registered indigents 207 92 91 116 92 74 67
Registered indigents as % of catchment area population 1.2% 0.7% 0.3% 1.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4%
Number of indigents that attended the health facility in 2013 N.A.a 44 29 67 32 44 40
% registered indigents that attended health facility in 2013 N.A.a 47.8% 31.9% 57.8% 34.8% 59.5% 59.7%
Registered indigents that attended health facility in 2013
as % of catchment area population
N.A.a 0.3% 0.1% 0.7% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2%
aConsultation list did not match the list of registered indigents.
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participants at the Douvangar facility also mentioned that they got
‘10 000 CFA from the health facility’ when they were referred.
Change in quality of care. Both indigent and non-indigent partici-
pants identified improvements in quality of care since the introduc-
tion of PBF, particularly in the area of hygiene and facilities ‘There
are changes: there are new buildings, the toilets are well maintained,
and there are no more flies’(Male non-indigent, Mayo-Oulde´me´).
Some differences between indigent and non-indigent groups were
noted. In indigent groups, a few participants mentioned that they
were prioritized over other patients, while in non-indigent groups
long queues were perceived as an inconvenience. In indigent groups,
many participants perceived positive changes in attitudes of health
care staff ‘The other nurses used to scold us but these don’t do that
and when you arrive they immediately help you’(Female indigent,
Mayo-Oulde´me´). In non-indigent groups, some participants men-
tioned lack of respect, impatience and unavailability of staff ‘Often
the nurses are not in place. Either they are at home or in a
bar’(Female non-indigent, Douvangar).
Other targeting-related effects. Several other positive effects of the
targeting system were perceived. A direct positive effect was less fi-
nancial worries. One important indirect effect mentioned by many in-
digent participants was an improvement in economic status due to
better health ‘I went to the hospital many times. I was treated for free
and I now notice that poverty has also reduced’(Female indigents,
Tokombe´re´) ‘Now that I am cured I can do other activities like culti-
vate land again’(Female indigent, Tokombe´re´). Other indirect effects
that were mentioned by a few indigents in a few groups were expos-
ure to health and hygiene education and access to other services such
as food and water. Key Informants also mentioned positive effects,
particularly more motivated staff, work efficiency, more trainings and
equipment and a better collaboration between the COSA and the fa-
cility ‘There is more dialogue between health staff and the COSA;
there are no more secrets. We have regular meetings in which we de-
velop our business plans together.’(Health personnel, Domayo).
Several negative effects were also identified. Although there were
no direct indications of stigmatization, negative reactions of commu-
nity members such as jealousy or incomprehension were perceived as
disrupting by indigent participants ‘The neighbors are jealous, they
don’t want to bring us to the facilities with their transport and if you
don’t have transport you cannot get to the center’(Female indigent,
Mayo-Oulde´me´). One key informant remarked that due to labelling
some indigents felt ‘privileged over other community
members’(Facility director, Guili). In the non-indigent groups, feel-
ings of injustice and jealousy were confirmed ‘It’s good to help those
that don’t have any resources but why only select some?’ (Female
non-indigent, Mayo-Oulde´me´). In turn, some non-indigent partici-
pants noted that the health care fees had gone up the past year/
months ‘I don’t really see a change; the fees have actually gone up.
For instance, some medical fees have gone from 1000to 2000FCFA,
for adults the fees have even gone up from 2000to
4000FCFA’(Female non-indigent, Douvangar) and that the facility
was less flexible with giving loans ‘The hospital is not like before; a
lot has changed. Before we used to be able to get loans for medicines
now you have to have cash’(Male non-indigent, Tokombe´re´).
Key informants identified additional negative effects. Many men-
tioned an increase in workload, lack of staff and discussions/conflicts
about the distribution of the performance bonuses ‘There is an increase
in tasks which also increase the waiting time for patients’(Health per-
sonnel, Domayo). At the Goudjoumde´le´ facility key informants
mentioned that targeting had led to more costs ‘PBF has influenced the
cost of care. Indigents generally come to the center when the illness is
severe and the costs often surpass the amount we get. We lose more
than we gain’(Health personnel, Goudjoumde´le´). Conversely, others
mentioned that PBF had lowered the fees for patients and that the prof-
itability of the centre had increased ‘With the arrival of PBF instead of
paying 10 000 CFA, patients will be paying 2000or 5000FCFA which
is already half’(Health personnel, Tokombe´re´).
Discussion
This study showed that within the targeting system in Northern
Cameroon community health workers were able to identify very
poor and vulnerable people with a minimal chance of leakage to
non-poor people. Nevertheless, the system only reached a tiny pro-
portion of the population and a substantial part of the population
that can also be considered poor and socially vulnerable people was
missed. Low a priori objectives and implementation problems are
likely to explain this. Several positive and negative effects of the tar-
geting system were identified. Indigents perceived improvements in
economic status, access, quality and promptness of care while nega-
tive reactions (e.g. jealousy) of other community members towards
indigents were perceived as negative effects.
Some methodological strengths and limitations need be ad-
dressed. A strength is that we collected data from different sources
using different methods which allowed us to triangulate data (Pope
and Mays 2000). The large number of interviews and FGDs that
were conducted with different groups (indigents and non-indigents)
were an additional strength. There were also some limitations. By
conducting FGDs in several languages some information may have
gotten lost during the translation process. Social desirability and re-
sponse bias (i.e. more response from those indigents that attended
the facilities) could have influenced the results found. Additionally,
contextual factors such as increases in drug costs or changes in the
PBF mechanisms and indicator pricing may have influenced the re-
sults found.
In line with other studies (Noirhomme et al., 2007; Ridde et al.,
2010a, 2011a), we found that community health workers ‘are’ able
to identify those people that are most vulnerable and poor and that
leakage with this community-based approach was minimal. On the
other hand, our study revealed that only a tiny proportion of the
population (1%) was reached with the approach. We had expected
larger percentages based on the literature. For instance, the propor-
tion of the population in Northern Cameroon that falls in the poor-
est quintile (according to country-level cut-offs) is 54.8% (INS and
ICF International 2012). Also, 5% of the Cameroonian population
was estimated to be disabled in 2012 (INS and ICF International
2012). A study conducted in Burkina Faso, estimated that 10–20%
of the population could be considered indigent (Ridde et al., 2010a).
We found that implementation problems probably exacerbated
the (under)coverage. As noted by others (Davies and Taylor-Vaissey
1997; Grol and Grimshaw 2003; Grol et al. 2007), the implementa-
tion of new guidelines in routine health care practice is driven
by a variety of inhibiting and enabling factors. For community-
based targeting to succeed, all of these factors need to be considered
(Grol et al. 2007). In Cameroon, financial incentives for motivating
community health workers to implement the targeting system
were considered insufficient given the increase in workload. Also,
there was no transport to identify indigents. Financial disincentives
and transport problems were also found to play a role in other com-
munity-based targeting systems in Africa (Ridde et al. 2010b,
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2011a;Maluka, 2013). Grol et al. (2007) note that provision of re-
sources, awards and (financial) incentives influence the volume of
activities. At the individual level, adequate knowledge about the
guidelines and positive attitudes are important (Grol et al. 2007). In
our study area in Cameroon and in other similar settings (Ridde
et al. 2010a;Maluka 2013), community health workers particularly
targeted easily identifiable groups such as the elderly and orphans.
Although this may reflect demographics, with rural-urban migration
by young people leaving many elderly in rural areas without support
(the so-called ‘rural exodus’) (Barbier et al. 1981) this may also re-
flect negative attitudes towards the current criteria (e.g. guidelines
unclear, resistance to predefined criteria) or a lack of knowledge
about the criteria. Last, there were social factors that were driving
the implementation problems in Cameroon. Of importance was the
finding that there was dispute about the distribution of performance
bonuses and feelings of injustice. As a result, community health
workers and health personnel were less motivated to perform well.
A strong feeling of control and recognizing the output achieved is
found to be crucial to successful implementation (Davies and
Taylor-Vaissey 1997; Grol and Grimshaw 2003; Grol et al. 2007).
Despite the implementation problems identified, positive effects
of the targeting system were perceived including improvements in
access, quality and promptness of care as well as less financial wor-
ries and improvements in economic status for indigents.
Nevertheless, lack of transport, distance to the health centres and
poor knowledge about the targeting benefits continued to hamper
indigents to seek care, as also reported by others Hardeman et al.
(2004) and Ridde et al. (2011b).
The improvements in quality of care noted in this study, particu-
larly in the area of hygiene and facilities, have been reported by
other PBF studies (Basinga et al. 2011; Soeters et al. 2011).
Conversely, we found that poor and vulnerable groups not regis-
tered as indigent perceived longer waiting times, less availability of
staff, increased user-fees and less flexibility with loans. In a recent
review (Gorter and Meessen 2013), several unintended side-effects
of PBF were noted, including a neglect of non-numerated activities
and adverse selection of patients. Although further research is war-
ranted, our study may also indicate that vulnerable populations not
directly targeted by PBF could be disadvantaged and fall by the
wayside.
Lessons learned from implementation practice
This study showed that community health workers are able to iden-
tify very poor and vulnerable people with a minimal chance of leak-
age to non-poor people. It also shows that such a targeting system
may improve access to care and perceived quality of care for the
most vulnerable of society. Conversely, coverage rates were found
to be very low, there were implementation problems and several
negative effects of the system were perceived. Before discussing rec-
ommendations for improving the system, it’s important to address
the issue of coverage. In situations of widespread poverty, such as in
Northern Cameroon, where many of the non-indigents were hardly
any better off than those identified as indigent by the programme,
results achieved may not outweigh the cost of targeting. Hence, pro-
gramme implementers should carefully consider the pros and cons
of implementing such a targeting system since other strategies, such
as social security schemes, might be more effective in achieving in-
crease in access to care.
When implementing targeting systems, programme implementers
are advised to base objectives/targets on evidence on the size of the
target population, taking into account both social and economic
vulnerability. Once these objectives are set, they should be carefully
communicated to those working with them, ensuring they are not in-
terpreted as a quota. When working with community health work-
ers in a targeting system, it is essential to think about incentives,
either in the form of money, trainings and/or transport (e.g. avail-
ability of a bike, car/moto). The extra workload for health care
workers due to the system should be manageable. To ensure this,
close attention needs to be paid to the context when estimating indi-
cator pricing within PBF programmes so that costs are fully covered.
This is likely to lead to more equal distribution of funds and enables
health facilities to hire more staff. Last, programme implementers
should consider investing in a comprehensive targeting system which
includes a clear promotion component so that indigents are aware
of the system, indigent identification cards, transport and accom-
paniment to the health centre, referrals and follow-up visits.
Conclusion
This study shows that a system of targeting the poorest of society in
PBF programmes may help reduce inequalities in health care use,
but design and implementation problems can lead to substantial
under-coverage. Furthermore, remaining barriers to health care use
(e.g. transport) and negative reactions towards indigents due to their
status deserve attention.
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